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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Plaintiff Nicole Haberle’s long-time partner Timothy 
Nixon suffered from severe mental illness. Nixon committed 
suicide during an encounter with the Borough of Nazareth 
Police Department, and Haberle sued the Borough. She alleged 
that the Police Department’s failure to accommodate mentally 
disabled individuals constituted a violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and sought money damages. 
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Haberle’s challenge is before us for a second time. The 
District Court had previously dismissed her complaint, which 
raised the ADA claim and several constitutional claims. We 
affirmed in part the District Court’s dismissal, but remanded 
with instructions to provide Haberle leave to amend her ADA 
complaint. After Haberle filed an amended complaint, the 
District Court dismissed it for failure to allege intentional 
discrimination. Because Haberle’s complaint raises a plausible 
claim that the Police Department was deliberately indifferent 
in failing to enact policies accommodating mental disability, 
we will reverse and remand.  
 
I. 
We have previously described the facts as follows: 
Timothy Nixon suffered from a variety of 
mental health problems, including depression. 
For years, he had lived off and on with his long-
time partner, Ms. Haberle, and their two 
children. On May 20, 2013, he had “a serious 
mental health episode involving severe 
depression.” He called Haberle and told her that 
he was suicidal, and then broke into a friend’s 
home and took a handgun. He next went to his 
cousin’s apartment. 
 
Fearing for Nixon’s life, Haberle 
contacted the Borough of Nazareth Police 
Department. Officer Daniel Troxell obtained a 
warrant for Nixon’s arrest, and, having learned 
that Nixon was still at his cousin’s apartment, 
Troxell went there, accompanied by other 
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officers from the Borough and surrounding 
municipalities. Upon arriving at the apartment, 
some of the officers suggested setting up a 
perimeter and asking the Pennsylvania State 
Police to send crisis negotiators. Others 
suggested asking Haberle to help communicate 
with Nixon. Troxell rebuffed those suggestions, 
calling the other officers “a bunch of f[—]ing 
p[—]sies.” He declared his intention to 
immediately go to the apartment, because “[t]his 
is how we do things in Nazareth.” He did as he 
said, knocked on the door of the apartment, and 
identified himself as a police officer. Nixon then 
promptly went into one of the bedrooms of the 
apartment and turned the stolen gun on himself. 
Haberle v. Troxell (Haberle I), 885 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 
2018) (internal citations omitted, alterations in original).  
 
  Haberle sued the Borough of Nazareth, several 
members of its Police Department including Officer Troxell, 
and other Borough officials (collectively, defendants). She 
claimed that Nixon’s suicide was the foreseeable result of 
Officer Troxell’s decision to unconstitutionally seize Nixon in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment; Officer Troxell’s actions 
constituted a “state-created danger” in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause; and the 
Borough’s failure to implement police procedures to 
accommodate disabled individuals violated the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213. Id. at 
175. She sought money damages. Defendants successfully 
moved to dismiss Haberle’s complaint, and she appealed. 
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 On appeal, we upheld the District Court’s dismissal of 
Haberle’s Fourth Amendment (unconstitutional seizure) and 
Fourteenth Amendment (state-created danger) claims. Id. at 
176–78. We also held that, while the ADA applied to arrests, 
Haberle had not stated a claim for damages “because she [did] 
not allege facts showing that any inaction of the Borough 
reflect[ed] deliberate indifference,” which would be necessary 
to sustain a claim for damages. Id. at 178. We remanded with 
the direction that Haberle be given an opportunity to amend her 
complaint to cure that defect. Id. at 182. 
 
 Haberle then filed an amended complaint. She alleged 
that the Borough had “a history of violating the legal rights of 
residents of Nazareth,” listing use of excessive force, unlawful 
prosecution, and retaliation as examples. App’x 60–61 
(Complaint ¶ 29). With respect to the Borough’s disability 
accommodation practices, Haberle alleged that “[p]rior to the 
events underlying this action, a set of policies and procedures 
had been drafted by Officer Frederick Lahovski, Jr.” which 
“would have provided guidance to the Department in dealing 
with interactions with emotionally disturbed persons, such a[s] 
Timothy [Nixon].” App’x 62 (Complaint ¶¶ 30, 32). The Police 
Department did not adopt that policy. App’x 63 (Complaint ¶ 
39). Haberle also alleged that the Department’s officers and 
chief “routinely encountered several known mentally 
challenged individuals including two individuals known as 
‘Dickey’ and ‘Rosie,’” and “had a custom and practice of being 
verbally abusive, harassing, and, in at least one instance, 
arresting a mentally challenged person, including ‘Dickey’ and 
‘Rosie’ without regard to, or accommodation of, their mental 
disability.” App’x 63 (Complaint ¶¶ 35–36). She also asserted 
that “[h]ad Defendant Nazareth adopted the policy drafted by 
Officer Lahovski, or otherwise had in place effective policies 
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and procedures for dealing with mentally ill residents, and 
effective disciplinary procedures to enforce those policies, 
Timothy would have received the professional medical 
assistance which he so desperately needed.” App’x 64 
(Complaint ¶ 43).  
 
On defendants’ motion, the District Court dismissed 
Haberle’s amended complaint for failure to allege deliberate 
indifference. See Haberle for Estate of Nixon v. Borough of 
Nazareth, No. 15-2804, 2018 WL 4770682 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 
2018). Haberle now appeals.1  
 
II. 
To make out a claim for monetary damages under the 
ADA, Haberle must show deliberate indifference on the part of 
the Borough. See S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. 
Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2013). We have explained 
that deliberate indifference can be satisfied on a showing “the 
official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a 
substantial risk of serious harm.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 
F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).2 Haberle can establish such deliberate 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1343. This court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review the District Court’s dismissal under Federal 
Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Haberle, 885 F.3d at 175 
n.4. In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept 
all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 174 n.1. 
2 Though Beers-Capitol and Farmer involved 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 actions, the “definition of deliberate indifference in the . 
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indifference in one of two ways: “(i) showing that the 
[Department’s existing policies] failed to adequately respond 
to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs’, 
or (ii) showing that the risk of constitutionally cognizable harm 
was ‘so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure of 
supervisory officials to respond will alone’ support finding 
[deliberate indifference].” Id. at 136–37 (internal citations 
omitted); Haberle I, 885 F.3d at 181. We remanded in Haberle 
I to provide Haberle the chance to plausibly allege either of 
those two conditions. 
 
Haberle contends the District Court erred in concluding 
her amended complaint does not allege the Department failed 
to adequately respond to a pattern of like injuries.3 We agree 
with the District Court that conclusory allegations about 
Department misconduct do not amount to a plausible claim for 
                                              
. . ADA context is consistent with our standard of deliberate 
indifference in the context of § 1983 suits by prison inmates.” 
S.H., 729 F.3d at 263 n.23.  
3 Haberle’s reply brief suggests in passing that the risk of harm 
like Nixon’s was so great and obvious the Borough’s failure to 
respond evidences deliberate indifference. See Reply Br. at 4–
5. “Raising an issue in a reply brief is too late, for ‘[a]s a 
general matter, an appellant waives an argument in support of 
reversal if it is not raised in the opening brief.’ ‘[W]here an 
issue is raised for the first time in a reply brief, we deem it 
insufficiently preserved for review before this court.’” Garza 
v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 284–85 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(citations omitted, alterations in original) (first quoting In re: 
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 873 F.3d 232, 237 (3d 
Cir. 2017); then quoting Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 
(3d Cir. 1993)).  
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relief. We explained before that “general allegations that the 
Borough has ‘a history of violating the civil rights of 
residents’” were insufficient to demonstrate “a pattern of past 
occurrences of injuries like the plaintiff[’s],” id. at 182 
(citations omitted, alterations in original), and Haberle’s 
repetition of that allegation does not cure the defect we 
previously recognized.  
 
But Haberle’s amended complaint adds new allegations 
that together amount to a plausible claim that the Borough’s 
Police Department was deliberately indifferent in the face of a 
pattern of past occurrences of “injuries” like Nixon’s. See id. 
at 181. She alleges Department officers and its chief 
“routinely” encountered “mentally challenged individuals,” 
including two specifically named individuals. App’x 63 
(Complaint ¶ 35). In those encounters, the Complaint alleges, 
Department officers were often “verbally abusive” and 
“harassing,” and they performed arrests without 
accommodating the individuals’ disabilities. App’x 63 
(Complaint ¶ 36). In response to those and similar events, 
Officer Lahovski drafted a policy to guide Department 
interactions with disabled individuals. App’x 62, 63 
(Complaint ¶ 32, 37). He relied on his personal mental health 
training, Police Department procedures, and consultation with 
mental health professionals to draft the policy. App’x 62 
(Complaint ¶¶ 31, 33). Haberle further alleges that “[i]n 
drafting the said proposed policy, Officer Lahovski[] identified 
for Borough officials the grave risks to mentally challenged 
persons as a result of the Police Department continuing to 
operate without proper policies and procedures for the 
accommodation of mentally disabled persons,” but the 
Department did not adopt that or any other accommodation 
policy. App’x 63–64 (Complaint ¶¶ 38–39, 41).  
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Those allegations meet our directive to allege “facts 
indicating that the policies were drafted because of an 
awareness that the pre-existing policies were substantially 
likely to lead to a violation of citizens’ rights.” Haberle I, 885 
F.3d at 182. They amount to a plausible claim the Department 
was deliberately indifferent by failing to adopt the policies 
Officer Lahovski proposed. The District Court concluded 
otherwise on the basis that Haberle had not described “a pattern 
of Nazareth police mishandling encounters with citizens 
experiencing mental health crises that result in citizens’ 
suicides,” 2018 WL 4770682, at *4, but Haberle need not plead 
such specific allegations. She contends the Department 
deliberately failed to accommodate disabled individuals in 
police encounters in violation of the ADA. The past 
misconduct she invokes in her complaint did not have to result 
in the exact injury suffered by Nixon. Her amended pleading 
accordingly meets the level of specificity we prescribed in 
Haberle I: it alleges facts that support a history of encounters 
between disabled individuals and Department personnel that 
resulted in harm to those individuals, the Department’s 
awareness of those encounters and their risks, and its failure to 
adopt an offered policy to address them.  
 
III. 
Because Haberle has plausibly alleged a violation of the 
ADA, we will reverse the District Court’s grant of the 
Borough’s motion to dismiss and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
